A Brief Summary of the history of European Union enlargement
Consolidating the European Union, 1993 to the present day
The period since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty has been an eventful one in the history of the EU. It includes two treaties, three further enlargements and the creation of the euro zone. However, the abortive effort to gain approval for a Constitutional Treaty and foreign policy divisions over Iraq have created difficulties for those who attempt to chart its path. In this chapter, we examine the events between the Fourth and most recent enlargements, to see how effectively the Community has been transformed into a Union.
The background to the latest period in the evolution of postwar Europe was the ending of the Cold War. The threatening might of the Soviet Union had provided strong motivation for the countries to the west of the continent to cooperate and unite. The breakup of the USSR and the collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe arguably changed the situation in important respects. It reduced the need for the United States to remain as involved in European affairs as once it had been; it might no longer wish to police every trouble spot. It left a power vacuum to the east, with European leaders uncertain as to how political life in Russia and its neighboring states would develop. Russia itself had the potential to become again a key player on the continent. But in the former satellites governments varied from the strongly nationalist to the vaguely reformist and it was unclear what path they would pursue.
As for the European Community, which had just become a Union, one of the justifications for closer integration had been removed, a point noted by the Thatcherites in Britain. They claimed that integration was becoming obsolete. It had been originally conceived as a means of fending off the Soviet threat. Now that this had been removed, there was a case for a wider and much looser Europe. This might well be realised, for the Union was attractive to the ‘new democracies’ of Central and Eastern Europe which viewed it as an area of peace and stability.
They wanted to join and in Britain their membership was seen as particularly welcome. The countries of the ‘New Europe’ could become a counterpart to those of ‘Old Europe’, particularly the dominant Franco-German axis.
Pressure for expansion: the Fourth Enlargement
In the 1990s, the process of enlargement seemed to be accelerating. An increasing number of countries were queuing up to join the new Union, carrying the potential membership to between twenty-five and thirty. This was a very different situation from the first twenty-eight years, which is how long it took for membership to increase from six to twelve. After the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 the movement towards enlargement gathered additional momentum, until there were three groups of would-be members:
- • The first group consisted of Turkey, which applied in 1987, and the islands of Malta and Cyprus, both of which applied in 1990. In December 1989 the Commission advised the Council of Ministers to reject the Turkish application, partly because of doubts over human-rights violations. The applications of Cyprus and Malta remained on the table but were elbowed to one side by other developments.
- • The second group of aspirants to membership was former members of the Soviet bloc, most of whom negotiated ‘Europe Agreements’ with the EU giving them favourable trade terms. The countries most enthusiastic for membership were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
- • The third group consisted of former EFTA countries which, concerned at the implications of the single market and freed from fears for their neutrality by the end of the Cold War, applied first for associate status and then for full membership. The applicants were Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, who initially joined the single market to form a European Economic Area (EEA).
Britain was very keen on these five applicants because:
1. Enlargement might help to dilute the federalist tendencies within the Union.
2. All five countries were wealthy and potential net contributors to the Community budget, easing the strain for existing ones.
In June 1993, the European Council offered the prospect of membership to all Central and Eastern European countries which either had agreed or were on the verge of concluding the Europe Agreements referred to above. It also set out a formal statement of requirements for membership that would have to be met by would-be entrants. These Copenhagen Criteria declared that applicants should be fully democratic, have a functioning market economy and be willing to adopt the acquis communautaire.
Meanwhile, as a result of a referendum in December 1992, Switzerland had already withdrawn its application to join both the EEA and EU. However, Austria, Sweden and Finland, three traditionally non-aligned states, had pressed ahead and opened negotiations in February 1993, with Norway following in April. Negotiations were rapid. All issues were resolved by early March 1994 and accession for the four countries was planned for 1 January 1995. But the applicant countries still had to seek the approval of their own citizens. Referendums in Austria, Finland and Sweden approved the accession agreements, although by very small majorities in the latter two cases. Then, in November, the people of Norway voted against membership, as they had done in 1972. Norway joined Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland in being the only Western European countries not belonging to the EU, retaining the trading benefits of EEA membership but lacking any power to influence decisions of that body.
Norway is often cited by eurosceptics as an example of a country that manages to reap the trading benefits of EEA membership without the adverse factors of EU membership. The suggestion is sometimes made that such an arrangement would provide an ideal solution for the UK. However, as Hugo Young has pointed out, the idea that Norway has all the advantages of membership without any of the disadvantages is the reverse of the truth:
The entire apparatus of EU rules on immigration, transport, manufacture and trade in goods and services applies in Norway. Norway’s courts and companies live under law as interpreted by the European Court in Luxembourg. This is the precondition for Norway’s trade with the EU, unmediated, however, by the presence of any Norwegian ministers at the political table.
Appointment of the Santer Commission
The main business of the European Council held on the island of Corfu in June 1994 was the election of a new president of the Commission to succeed Jacques Delors. According to tradition the presidency of the Commission is held alternately by someone coming from a large member country and someone from a small country, by someone on the left and someone on the right. As the Commission had been headed by a French socialist from a large country, it therefore followed that the new president should be a centre-right politician from one of the Benelux countries.
The most obvious candidates were Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and Jean-Luc Dehaene, prime minister of Belgium. However, there were strong differences of opinion among member states about their respective merits and therefore a compromise candidate was chosen. The name of Jacques Santer, prime minister of Luxembourg, was put forward and the new Parliament elected in June 1994 exercised its right, granted by the Maastricht Treaty, to vote on whether to accept the nominee. Santer was accepted by a mere twenty-two votes. Within four years of his assumption of that position, his presidency was in tatters. In March 1999, he and all his fellow commissioners had been forced to resign, amid allegations of fraud and mismanagement. Santer’s successor, Romano Prodi, set about producing and implementing a reform programme to improve the image of the Commission.
A change of government in Britain: New Labour in office
The European Union became an important issue in the 1997 general election. The debate on Europe was initiated by eurosceptics in the Conservative Party and encouraged by the tabloid press. Later, Labour introduced the topic, knowing that a mere mention of Europe provoked a Tory response that was both self-destructive and self-defeating. Discussions on the subject were almost exclusively about the single currency, about which the general public had no firm opinion. Labour won the election handsomely. Thereafter, the re-establishment of Britain’s position in Europe was one of the first priorities of the Blair government. Within days of assuming office, the British government committed itself to signing the Social Chapter and agreed to extensions of majority voting. Doug Henderson was appointed as the first specifically European minister at the Foreign Office and it was made clear that in future intergovernmental talks Britain would be represented by Henderson as a minister, rather than by a civil servant as had been the case under the Conservatives – thus bringing UK procedures into line with other member states. Within a month Robin Cook had gone further than any British minister had gone before by appointing an MEP as his European parliamentary private secretary to handle liaison with the EP.
These concessions, together with a willingness to negotiate and accept compromises rather than seek confrontation, sent out hints to Europe that Britain would henceforth be far less obstructionist than had been the case in recent years. This change in relations between Britain and the EU may to some extent have been more a difference of style and attitude than of substance, but it proved acceptable to the other members.
On becoming leader, Tony Blair soon made it clear that he wished Britain to play a constructive role in Europe. He had not always been so enthusiastic, but by the time he became leader in 1994 he was describing himself as a passionate European. He wanted to see the country ‘at the centre of Europe’, fulfilling its destiny on the continent and its ‘historical role in the world’. Without being active within the Union, Britain would forfeit any chance of global influence; Europe must be ‘our base’.
