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Proposed in 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was ratified by most member states in 2008, but a referendum in Ireland-the only country that put the Lisbon agreement to a public vote-rejected it on June 12, 2008, thus jeopardizing the entire treaty. More than a year later, on October 2, 2009, Ireland held a second referendum, which passed. Poland’s government also had expressed reservations, but it ratified the treaty a week after the Irish vote, after securing opt-outs from EU policy on some social issues, such as abortion. The Czech Republic was the last remaining holdout: though its Parliament had ratified the treaty, the country’s president, Václav Klaus, withheld his signature. Finally, after the Czech courts ruled that the treaty did not violate the country’s constitution, Klaus signed it on November 3, 2009. The Lisbon Treaty, thus ratified by all 27 member states, entered into force on December 1, 2009.
While it was not explicitly called a European constitution, the treaty addressed a number of issues that had been central to the 2004 EU draft constitution, an initiative that was scuttled after voters in France and the Netherlands rejected it in 2005. Under the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Community-which had provided the economic framework upon which the EU was built-disappeared, and its powers and structure were incorporated into the EU. Moreover, the office of a permanent EU president was created, with the president chosen by the leaders of the member countries from a pool of candidates that they had selected. The leader holding this two-and-a-half-year post, officially called the president of the European Council, would provide a “face” for the EU in matters of Union policy. (The rotating EU presidency, whereby each member country assumes a leadership role for a period of six months, was retained, although its mandate would be narrowed.) Another new position, that of high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, gathered the EU’s two foreign affairs portfolios into a single office, with the goal of creating a more robust and unified European foreign policy. The power of the European Parliament also was enhanced and its number of seats revised. Additionally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, initially proposed at the Council of Nice in 2000, entered into force as part of the Lisbon Treaty. It spelled out a host of civil, political, economic, and social rights guaranteed to all citizens of the EU.
Perhaps the most sweeping changes, though, were to the voting mechanisms that determined EU policy. Within the Council of the European Union-the EU’s main decision-making body-the system of qualified majority voting (QMV), previously used only in certain circumstances, was extended to more policy areas, thereby easing the decision-making process. In addition, for most decisions, 55 percent of member states, provided they represented 65 percent of the EU’s population, would be able to approve a measure. This “double majority” voting rule, which represents a simplification of the former system of weighted votes, would be phased in over time. Matters of defense, foreign policy, social security, and taxation would still require unanimous approval, however. While QMV and the “double majority” rule were designed to streamline decision making at the highest levels, critics argued that they would reduce the influence of smaller countries at the expense of larger ones. Partly to address this, the Lisbon Treaty introduced the European Citizens’ Initiative, a process by which EU citizens could directly petition the European Commission (the EU’s main executive body) by gathering one million signatures from a number of member states.
At the time of the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification, the EU was experiencing a period of territorial expansion and economic growth. The debt crisis that would hobble the euro zone economy was still on the horizon, and Bulgaria and Romania had completed the accession process just two years earlier. Little public attention was paid to Article 50 of the treaty, which outlined the provisions under which a country could leave the EU. As the Greek economy spiraled out of control in 2010 and austerity measures failed to slow its descent, EU leaders began to seriously address the possibility of a “Grexit” (“Greek exit”) from the euro zone and the EU. Article 50 dealt with a country’s voluntary separation from the EU, however, and the mechanisms under which a member might be expelled were unclear. Greece ultimately reached an agreement with its creditors and the immediate crisis was averted, but the economic downturn was just one of a series of challenges to befall the EU in the early 2010s.
Russia’s forcible annexation of the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea in 2014 and a migrant crisis that saw hundreds of thousands of refugees seeking asylum in Europe helped fuel a growing sense of Euroskepticism. That sentiment manifested most overtly in a June 2016 “in or out” referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership in the EU. On June 23, 2016, some 52 per cent of British voters chose to leave the EU. British Prime Minister David Cameron immediately announced that he would step down, and EU officials stated that no formal or informal discussions of Britain’s relationship with the EU would begin until the United Kingdom formally initiated Article 50 proceedings.
Cameron’s successor, Theresa May, pushed ahead with the so-called “Brexit,” but that effort was checked in November 2016 when Britain’s High Court ruled that the government could not trigger Article 50 without parliamentary approval. Peers in the House of Lords unsuccessfully attempted to soften the terms of the bill, and Parliament approved May’s “hard Brexit” (which would sever political and economic ties between the U.K. and the EU and restore full border controls between the two entities) on March 13, 2017. On March 29 May submitted a letter to EU Pres. Donald Tusk formally triggering Article 50 and beginning a two-year period of exit negotiations.
Hedging and modality versus strident claims and the apparent absence of doubt
In everyday speech we talk about ‘hedging your bets’ when you reduce your risk of serious loss by placing money on at least two possible results, the principle being that the gain made on one bet will at least partially compensate for the loss made on another. The expression is then extended beyond the domain of gambling to all transactions or dealings in which one tries to be prepared for two or more outcomes. We also say that people hedge when they do not make a firm commitment or do not give a direct response, and in this case, the word has mildly negative connotations as it implies that our interlocutor is not being entirely straight with us.
When linguists talk of hedging, the word is stripped of its negative connotations and assumes the status of a technical term. For Bloor and Bloor, ‘Hedging is a linguistic avoidance of full commitment or precision. It is a vague but useful term covering a range of phenomena.’ This brief definition provides no information as to why people resort to hedging, and for this, we can turn to Machin and Mayr: ‘Hedging can be used to distance ourselves from what we say and to attempt to dilute the force of our statements and therefore reduce chances of unwelcome responses.’
During the present crisis beginning in 2008, people worry about rising inequality, weaker social protection and the divergence of income levels between the core and the periphery of the European Union (EU). The financial crisis has been blamed on inequality (Rajan 2010; OECD 2015) as poor strata of the population (in the United States, but also in Europe’s periphery) borrowed funds to acquire housing or maintain consumption levels in spite of low and stagnating wages. On the side of lenders, high inequality contributed to an overhang of savings as the rich have a higher propensity to save, and investment in the real economy stagnates in the face of weak demand.
It is national parties which select the candidates who stand in European elections, and who run the campaigns designed to bring about their victory. They may increasingly use the literature of the transnational groupings, but they fight primarily on national rather than European issues and they interpret the outcome very much in terms of what it means for their standing in domestic politics. Party politicians attend EU gatherings as national figures, advancing their countries’ interests. They will be influenced by their position on the political spectrum, those who are left-inclined being more concerned with social justice, protecting employment and supporting stronger environmental action and those on the right is more concerned with deregulation of business, free markets and open trading policies. But these ideological leanings usually take second place to arguments based on national interest and the leaders’ perceptions of the demands of the political situation ‘back home’.